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ABSTRACT:
We generalize Deitchman’s guerrilla warfare model to account for trade-off between in-
telligence (‘bits’) and firepower (‘shots’). Intelligent targeting leads to aimed fire; absence
of intelligence leads to unaimed fire, dependent on targets’ density. We propose a new
Lanchester-type model that mixes aimed and unaimed fire, the balance between these be-
ing determined by quality of information. We derive the model’s conserved quantity, and
use it to analyze the trade-off between investments in intelligence and in firepower—for
example, in counterinsurgency operations.
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1 Introduction
Good intelligence is key for effective combat operations. If a shooter knows exactly the loca-
tion and state of his targets, he can accurately target them with effective aimed fire. Absent
such information, the shooter is essentially ‘shooting in the dark’—utilizing unaimed fire
whose effectiveness depends on the density of the targets. Arguably, such unaimed fire is
less effective than aimed fire, and it may also result in substantial unintended collateral dam-
age. At its simplest, the balance between aimed and unaimed fire boils down to the trade-off
between situational awareness (‘bits’) and firepower (‘shots’).
Our purpose in this paper is towrite down and analyze a simple, prototypical systemof two
coupled differential equations which mixes aimed and unaimed fire, in the sense of Lanch-
ester’s models. It is perhaps surprising that this has not been done before. A step towards
it is Deitchman’s guerrilla warfare model [1], an asymmetric variant of Lanchester’s models
[2] in which aimed fire from guerrilla forces is opposed by unaimed fire from conventional
forces. Deitchman’s model was extended by Schaffer [3], who used the model to suggest new
military hardware. The idea of modeling the trade-off between firepower and intelligence in
a Lanchester setting was first suggested by Schreiber [4], albeit in a somewhat different con-
text. Schreiber’s model uses a reciprocal switching function between aimed and unaimed fire,
whereas ours has simple linear interpolation. The main resulting difference between the two
approaches is in their behaviour as the battle is scaled up: higher engaged numbers result in
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a shift towards aimed fire in the Schreiber model and towards unaimed fire in ours.
Our model captures the dynamics of a perennial problem of combat, which recurs in dif-
ferent contexts through the ages: finding the best trade-off between rate and accuracy of fire.
This trade-off concerns both the optimal use of single weapons—archery, anti-aircraft fire, bat-
tleship gunnery and musketry from its inception to the modern day—and finding the correct
weapons mix, such as SAMs and flak against aircraft, or depth charges and torpedos against
submarines. After an initial analysis of the model we specialize, for simplicity and without
much loss of generality, to the situation in which only one side has this mix of fire and thus
faces the trade-off problem, while the other can aim all of its fire. Although our results are
applicable wherever the rate/accuracy trade-off problem bites, we choose to illustrate it in
the context of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
We assume that in COIN war it is straightforward for the insurgents to identify state forces,
so that all insurgent fire is aimed. In fact we could equally have made it unaimed; the point
is that only the state, with the problem of distinguishing insurgents from civilians, faces the
bits vs shots trade-off problem. Assuming that the resources for both capabilities are derived
from the same pot (e.g. defense budget) the question is how to allocate the resources between
them. Typically, in COIN settings, the state forces are confronted by relatively small armed
groups, diffused in the population, which are ill-equipped and poorly trained. In terms of
physical net assessment, insurgents are no match for state forces, at least not in the early
stages of the insurgency. For example, in September 2011, the estimated number of insurgents
in Syria was around 10,000 people [5], while the Syrian armed forces (active, reserve and
paramilitary personnel) were estimated at over 700,000 soldiers [6]. The key advantage of
the insurgents is their elusiveness and invisibility while blended into the civilian population,
which make it difficult for state forces to identify insurgent targets and execute effective COIN
operations. Thus, while intelligence is a key component in any conflict situation, it is critical in
COIN operations. The problem of the state is how to divide limited COIN resources between
gathering information about the insurgents and accumulating firepower that can effectively
engage them.
There have been many attempts to model insurgencies as dynamical systems. Descriptive
models have addressed the effect of civilian collateral casualties generated by the state [7]
and by the insurgents [8] on public response and, consequently, on the fate of the insurgency,
the impact of collective memory on popular behavior towards the state and the insurgents
[9], and the spatial dynamics of such conflicts [10]. Berman et al. model COIN as a three-
way contest between violent insurgents, a state seeking to minimize violence, and civilians
deciding whether to share information with the state [11]. A related paper compares two
possible COIN tactics —‘fire’ (high violence) and ‘water’ (low violence)—using optimal con-
trol techniques [12]. Bohorquez et al. reveal, in an empirical study, some unique patterns
regarding the size and timing distributions of insurgencies [13], which may be explained by
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notions of coalescence and fragmentation of insurgent groups. The dynamical problems of
intelligence collection itself are treated by Kaplan and collaborators [14], while Schaffer has
introduced an updated model which contrasts 21st century insurgency with Vietnam [15].
For recent overviews of the literature on mathematical modeling of intelligence and warfare
see [16] and [17], respectively. In this note, however, we do not attempt to deal with dynam-
ical non-physical variables such as psychological and social effects in COIN. Our intention
is to construct and analyze no more than a homogeneous model of attrition, with all of the
simplifications that this implies. In Epstein’s categorization of reasons to model [18], ours is
to illustrate the core dynamics of the trade-off in combat attrition between two parameters:
rate of fire, and intelligence. Important questions such as how popular opinion shifts over
time, and how it impacts upon the evolution and outcome of a conflict, are dealt with in
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
In the next section we extendDeitchman’s classical model for the case of partial intelligence
(on both sides) and obtain the conserved quantity. In the rest of the paper we focus on the
asymmetrical COIN situation. In Section 4 we discuss the trade-off between bits and shots
when cost information is unavailable. In Section 5 we present two constrained optimization
models when the costs of intelligence and firepower are known and the budget is either con-
strained or is to be minimized. We show that the two optimization problems produce the
same optimal solution. Summary and conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 The Generalized Deitchman Model
The core of the generalized model is a pair of parameters that interpolate aimed and unaimed
fire, representing the intelligence levels—hereafter called ‘intel’—of the two forces. The val-
ues of these parameter range between 0 (no intel—shooting in the dark, unaimed fire) and 1
(perfect intel—all fire is aimed). In this sectionwe obtain and interpret the conserved quantity
of such a mixed engagement.
Let the positive real variables B(t) and R(t) represent the sizes of the Blue and Red forces
respectively, and β and ρ denote their per-unit aimed-fire hit-rates, so that the Lanchester
aimed-fire model is
B˙ = −ρR , R˙ = −βB , (1)
where dots denote time-derivatives. Famously this system conserves βB2 − ρR2, resulting in
Lanchester’s ‘square law’. The Deitchman guerrilla model [1] mixes aimed fire by Red with
unaimed fire by Blue, so that
.






Note that rather than introduce a single parameter for unaimed fire (which must necessarily
have different dimensions than that for aimed fire) we retain β but introduce a new fixed
parameterNR, with the same dimensions asR andB, which parametrizes the density effect of
unaimed fire. The Deitchman model conserves 12βB
2−ρNRR, so that Blue’s fighting strength
is square-law while Red’s is linear-law, with Blue suffering a further disadvantage from the
factor of 1/2.
Our generalized Deitchman model introduces intel parameters µ and ν for Blue and Red,
and is
.
B = −ρR(ν + (1− ν)B/NB), (3)
.
R = −βB(µ+ (1− µ)R/NR).
Notice that Deitchman’s model is obtained when µ = 0 and ν = 1.
Analogously to elementary Lanchester theory, we compute the conserved quantity Q for
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βB(µ+ (1− µ)R/NR)
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is constant throughout the battle. This expression interpolates between Lanchester linear and
square laws, just as it should: in the µ, ν → 0 limit the second, logarithmic term in each
bracket vanishes and we have Q = βNBB − ρNRR, the linear law, while in the µ, ν → 1
limit, and after expanding the logarithm as a Taylor series, we have Q = 12βB
2 − 12ρR2, the
square law. The mixed limit ν → 1, µ→ 0 gives the conserved quantity 12βB2 − ρNRR of the
Deitchman model. We discuss these limits in more detail in the next section.
Blue’s goal is to maximize Q over B, β and µ, Red’s to minimize it over R, ρ and ν. In the
Lanchester limits this is simple, since Q takes the form Q = f(NB , B, β) − f(NR, R, ρ). So
Blue (say) seeks to maximize f , independent of Red’s choices, and an increase in its forces
B by a factor k is equivalent to an increase in its hit-rate β by a factor k for the Linear Law
and k2 for the Square Law. In our model, however, the situation is more complex, for now
Q = f(NB, B, β, ν) − f(NR, R, ρ, µ), and Blue’s and Red’s optimal strategies are no longer
independent, because ν is chosen by Red and µ by Blue. So Blue has to maximize Q given
that Red is trying to minimize it, and vice versa. This moves us into the fascinating territory
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of diffferential games [19]—but a full minimax analysis rapidly becomes unwieldy and unil-
luminating (in part because there is no canonical cost function), and is certainly beyond the
scope of this note. Rather we proceed in the next section with a fuller analysis of the situation
in which one side is able to aim all of its fire. The analysis is quite general, but is presented in
the context of COIN.
3 COIN Model
Consider a COIN situationwhereB = G are the state (‘Governmant’) forces andR = I are the
‘Insurgents’, who are embedded in a civilian population of sizeP . The insurgents have perfect
situational awareness regarding the state forces and therefore can utilize effective aimed fire,
ν = 1. The state forces, on the other hand, who do not have this perfect awareness, have to
utilize a fraction (1−µ) of their firepower for unaimed engagement, where only a fraction IP of
this firepower is effective. If the hit rates are α and γ for the insurgents and state, respectively,
then (3) becomes
G˙ = −αI (7)
I˙ = −γG
(



















where G0 and I0 are the initial force sizes of the state and the insurgency respectively.
We observe immediately from (8) that, in terms of the trade-off between hit-rate and force
size, the state fights a Lanchester square law war: its fighting strength, the left-hand side of
(8), is γG20.
Defining κ := α/γ, y := G0/P, x := I0/P and z :=
1−µ




(1− µ)2 [z − log (1 + z)] . (9)
This has the expected limits. When z is small, which occurs if µ ≃ 1 (mostly aimed fire) or
















At the other extreme, when µ→ 0we have z →∞ and log(1 + z)/z → 0. The right-hand side
of (9) then approaches 2κx, just as in the Deitchman, µ = 0 case.
In Figure 1 we plot the phase portrait with direction field and parity curve. Under the gen-
eralized square law (11), the parity curve is linear, so that for a clear departure from linearity
z must not be too small. Even if the insurgency is concentrated in a sparsely populated area,
for example P = 3I0 (that is, x = 1/3), we only see departure from linearity at very small
values of µ. Figure 1 uses x ≤ 1/3, κ = 1, µ = 0.01. For µ > 0.1 the parity curve is practically
indistinguishable from a straight line.
With limited endurance, where the state tolerates attrition up to G0 −G and the insurgents









I0 − I − µP
1− µ log
[
1 + 1−µµP I0
1 + 1−µµP I
])
. (12)
Figure 1: Phase portrait of generalized Deitchman model for κ = 1,
µ = 0.01. The parity curve separates the two forces’ victory regimes.
4 Firepower-Intel Trade-off in COIN
In many modes of combat there is natural trade-off between firepower and intelligence that
is manifested in fire rate: shoot now or wait for more accurate targeting information? Waiting
for better intelligence (higher µ) results in larger inter-firing time and therefore lower γ. This
trade-off is significant in particular in COIN situations because of the high cost of collateral
damage.
Recall (as noted above) that in a square-law fight a proportionate improvement in numbers
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is twice as valuable as the same proportionate improvement in unit hit-rate [2]. We formalize
this with the logarithmic derivative,















[z − log(1 + z)]
, (14)




µ x as before. Then we find immediately that dγ = 1, dG0 = 2, dα = −1:
increasing numbers gives twice the improvement of increasing hit-rate or reducing vulnera-
bility, the standard square law result.
For intel, though, the logarithmic derivative is not appropriate, essentially because γ ∈











(z + 1)(z − log(1 + z))
])
. (15)
How doesDµ behave? As µ→ 1,Dµ → 1µ(1− 2x3 ). As µ→ 0we find thatDµ has a logarithmic
divergence; its behavior is Dµ ∼ log zx − x+1x +O(log z/z).
In Figure 2a we plot Dµ(µ) for a representative x, here x = 1/3 as before. The crucial value
is that at which Dµ = 1, since it is here that crossover with dγ ≡ 1 occurs. In Fig. 2a this
critical µc is approximately 0.7. In Figure 2b we plot µc as a function of 1/x for integer values
1 through 20.
Figure 2: Plots of (a)Dµ against µ for x = 1/3, (b) crit-
ical values µc, at which Dµc = 1, for 1/x = 1, . . . , 20.
So intel, which enables a small additional percentage of fire to be targeted accurately, is
of greater value than an equivalent proportional increase in γ or G2 provided µ < µc. The
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operational lesson is that when intel is poor, it is better to turn a percentage of your untargeted
fire into intelligent fire than it is to increase hit-rate by the same percentage. When intel is
already high the opposite is true. This crossover happens at high values of µ, with µc → 1 as
x → 0: for example, if x = 1/3 then µc ≃ 0.72. That is, if two-thirds of your untargeted fire
goes astray, then more bits are better than more shots until nearly three-quarters of your fire
is intelligent.
5 The Cost of COIN
The state wishes to reduce the insurgency, and the question is how to achieve the correct
balance between intel and firepower efforts. As we noted above, our model is fundamentally
Lanchester-like: it already combines lethality γ and numbers G0, and thereby the trade-off
between them, in the form γG20. So we suppose now that the cost of COIN operations is linear
in both efforts, the combined firepower γG20 and intel µ. That is,
C(COIN) = c1γG
2
0 + c2µ , (16)
and the trade-off between γ and µ is investigated by holding G0 fixed. Such a cost function
might naturally be extended to more general monotonic functions of γ, G0 and µ, but we do
not consider this here.
We consider two optimization problems. First, we minimize the total cost of conducting
COIN operations subject to the constraint that the state does not lose the conflict, initially
for a campaign of annihilation and then when there is limited loss toleration on both sides.
Second, we maximize the force advantage (left-hand side minus right-hand of (8) when the
forces are not at parity) subject to a fixed budget constraint.
5.1 Minimizing Cost
To simplify the model we first assume a full-annihilation case where G = I = 0. The objec-
tive now is to minimize c1γG
2
0 + c2µ subject to the parity condition in (8). Substituting γG
2
0
computed from (8) in the cost function above we have







































Our task is to find the value of µ (in the interval 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1) which minimizes fx,r(µ), for
0 < x < 1 and r > 0.
First, note that fx,r(µ) → x and f ′x,r(µ) → −∞ as µ → 0. Thus the minimum is always
at a strictly-positive value of µ: however expensive intel may be, it is always best to have at
least a little of it. (This might seem somewhat counterintuitive since, if x = 1, targeted and
untargeted fire are equivalent initially, making any spend on intel initially wasteful. But note
that, even if x = I0/P = 1 initially, I/P will become less than one during the battle and will
become small towards its end, when intel will become crucial.)








2 (via a se-
ries expansion of the logarithm and a little algebra). Thus (since we observe that f is either
monotone or unimodal) the minimum cost is found at the end of the interval, µ = 1, when
r ≤ 1− 2x3 . That is, other things equal, if intelligence is cheap enough then it is always better
to acquire it in full capability. Since x ≤ 1 necessarily, if r ≤ 1/3 then this applies regardless
of the signature value x.
For r > 1 − 2x3 the minimum is interior, 0 < µmin < 1, and our task is to understand how
its location varies with x and r. An analytic solution is not illuminating. Rather we begin in
Figure 3 by plotting a typical curve, here for x = 1/3, r = 5.
Figure 3: Scaled cost function f(µ)
plotted against µ for x = 1/3, r = 5.
The minimum, here at about µ = 0.25, decreases with increasing x or r. In Figure 4a, we
generalize Fig. 3 to give a plot of µmin, still with x = 1/3, for integer values of r from 1 to 10.
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Note that for r = 1 this minimum occurs at about 0.86; we saw above that when r ≤ 7/9 (that
is, r = 1 − 2x/3 with x = 1/3) the minimum reaches µ = 1. The value at r = 5 is the µmin of
Fig. 3.
In Figure 4b we generalize further to a plot of µmin as a function of r (again for integers from
1 to 10) and1/x (also integers from 1 to 10). Fig. 4a is the section at 1/x = 3. All calculations
were performed using Maple 14.
Figure 4: Plots of µmin (a) as a function of r for x = 1/3, (b) as a function of r and 1/x.
5.2 Limited endurance
Next assume that each side has limited endurance, which results in the parity condition given














(fx,r(µ)− fx,r(µ)) . (20)
If we assume that each side has the same tolerated proportion of losses then r¯ = r and the
analysis of (20) becomes more tractable. First, we observe that µ = 1 minimizes (20) when
r ≤ 1 − 23 x
2+xx+x2
x+x , a lower threshold than in the case of unlimited endurance where x = 0.
This means that limited loss toleration shifts the balance towards heavier weight on firepower
versus intel.
For an alternate scenario, suppose that I¯ = 0 (the insurgency continues until its anni-
hilation) but the state has limited loss toleration. Then µ = 1 minimzes (20) whenever
r¯ ≤ 1 − 2x/3, and the cost range for which full intel is optimal increases with the state’s
inability to tolerate losses.
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When x→ x (almost no toleration of losses), then, setting x = (1− ǫ)x, we have











1 r < 1− x
1√
r(1−x)
− x1−x 1− x ≤ r ≤ 1−xx2




At x = 1 the solution is µmin = 0: there is no initial difference between the effectiveness of
aimed and of unaimed fire, and thus no value in intel.
Thus, whatever the loss toleration, for imperfectly-targeted fire (x < 1) if intel is cheap
enough (that is, if r is low enough) then full intel is optimal. As loss toleration falls, this
‘cheap enough’ threshold also falls, from r = 1 − 23x in a war of annihilation to r = 1 − x for
minimal toleration of losses. If the state’s unaimed fire is very poorly targeted (x ≪ 1) then
the threshold is approximately r = 1, independent of loss toleration.
When full intel is not optimal, we can compare limited loss toleration with the annihilating
case. Figure 5a shows the plot of µmin against r, still with x = 1/3 and analogous to the
(x¯ = 0) annihilating case in Fig. 4a, but now with x¯ = 1/5. Figure 5b shows the difference
in µmin between the limited loss toleration case and the annihilating case—that is, the curve
of Fig. 4a minus that of Fig. 5a. As was mentioned above, we observe that, compared to
annihilation, limited loss toleration results in lower optimal values for intel.
Figure 5: (a) plot of µmin for limited losses x¯ = 1/5, (b)
difference∆µmin between x¯ = 1/5 and annihilating case.
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5.3 Maximizing force advantage
Here we return to G¯ = I¯ = 0, the war of annihilation. Suppose that, rather than the previ-
ous problem of choosing µ to minimize the cost of a marginal win, we instead choose µ to
maximize the firepower advantage (the difference between left- and right-hand sides of (8))
available at a given cost C = c1γG
2
0 + c2µ.
















or (equivalently) which minimizes
2αP 2fx,r(µ).
But this is precisely the same problem, with the same solution, as in sub-section 5.1. It makes
no difference whether the state wishes to minimize the cost of a bare win, or to maximize
its force advantage (and thereby minimize its losses) for a given cost outlay. Either way, the
optimum level of intel is the same.
6 Conclusions and Operational Lessons
We have written down and analyzed a variant of Lanchester’s models that mixes aimed and
unaimed fire by linear interpolation. This allowed us to model, in the simplest possible set-
ting, the trade-off between targeting and firing rate which is a crucial component of the oper-
ational use of many weapons systems.
As an application, we examined this trade-off in the context of counterinsurgent warfare,
in which state forces target an insurgency with a mix of aimed (well-targeted, ‘intelligent’)
and unaimed (random, ‘unintelligent’) fire. In contrast to other recent dynamical-systems
models of insurgent war (e.g. [7, 12]), we included no psychological variables, parameters or
feedbacks, no dynamics of popular opinion, no game theory. This was a purely attritional
model, with all the acknowledged deficiencies of these, in which the questionwas posed only
at its simplest: which, for various parameter regimes, is more likely to lead to a state victory,
‘bits’—better intelligence—or ‘shots’—increased firepower?
Even in this context, of attrition and annihilation, in which no account was taken of the hu-
man (and, in the end, political) costs of random violence, intelligence emerges as remarkably
valuable. First, whether from the point of view of minimizing cost or of maximizing force
advantage (both in section 5), it is always the case that if intel is sufficiently cheap then a force
can never have toomuch of it: perfect intel is themost effective option. This is true whether in
a battle of annihilation or of limited loss toleration, although this ‘sufficiently cheap’ thresh-
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old is reduced in the latter case. Estimates of realistic values of our cost ratio r would be
difficult to justify because this type of data is typically classified. But, for a given cost ratio, it
is clear that the optimal intel level increases rapidly as the accuracy of targeting x decreases.
Even without attempting a cost analysis, one can still compare intel with hit-rate and num-
bers (section 4). In our model, the state is fighting a square law battle, and a proportionate
increase is twice as valuable in numbers as in hit-rate. But an (absolute) increase in intel is
more valuable than a proportionate increase in (hit rate)× (numbers)2 for most combinations
of intel µ and accuracy x. This is our result at its starkest: bits are better than shots for all
points below the curve in Fig. 2b, and this likely covers most realistic values of the parame-
ters. Absent accurate estimates of these, and if the state has no strong reason to believe that its
intel is already excellent (µ is close to 1) and its unaimed fire not too random (say x > 1/2), it
should assume that more intel is the most cost-effective military option, independent of other
considerations.
Finally, future work on dynamic combat models should focus more on psychological and
social effects such as modeling the ’bandwagon’ effect, which captures how people are mobi-
lized to support or oppose a certain side in the conflict, in the presence of media-controlled
public information. Also, as mentioned in Section 2, the case where the two sides face the bits-
versus-shots dilemma naturally leads to a game-theoretic setting that may also be a subject
for future research.
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